This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. Lack of common knowledge leads players to second guess each other's behavior and makes coordination difficult. This restricts the range of equilibria and highlights the role of miscoordination payoffs in determining whether cooperation is sustainable or not. The paper characterizes the range of perfect Bayesian equilibria as the players' information becomes arbitrarily precise. Unlike in one-shot two-by-two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of small amounts of incomplete information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. These exit games are infinite horizon two-player games with a fixed discount factor. Every period, players unilaterally choose whether to stay or exit from a joint partnership. Staying is the cooperative action in the sense that staying increases the payoffs of one's partner. In each period t, players' payoffs are affected by an i.i.d. state of the world w t about which the players obtain noisy signals. This corresponds to a global games information structure. Because the players have different assessments of their environment, there will be miscoordination in equilibrium.
1 This fuels a process by which the players attempt to second guess each other's moves, potentially at the cost of reducing the scope for cooperation.
Within the class of dynamic global games with exit, the paper's main result is a characterization of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) and sequentially rationalizable strategies as the players' signals become arbitrarily precise. Specifically, the set of sequentially rationalizable strategies is bounded by extreme Markovian equilibria satisfying the following fixed point problem: players stay if and only if it is the risk-dominant action in a one-shot game augmented with the continuation value of playing in the same way in the future.
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In contrast with the case of static games studied by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) or Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003) , the global games information structure does not lead to equilibrium uniqueness in exit games. Indeed, because the time horizon is infinite, the players can hold multiple self-fulfilling expectations about the value of future interaction.
Despite multiplicity, the dominance solvability of static global games carries over in the weaker form of local dominance solvability. 3 Moreover, equilibria are locally unique under the global games information structure, whereas there is a continuum of equilibria under complete information.
From the perspective of applications, the fact that the global games perturbation does 1 Here "miscoordination" means that ex post, at least one player would like to change her play unilaterally.
2 See Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for a definition and an intuitive discussion of risk-dominance. 3 See Moulin (1984) or Guesnerie (2002) .
not yield uniqueness does not imply that it is irrelevant. By introducing a realistic risk of miscoordination in equilibrium, it places additional and intuitive restrictions on sustainable levels of cooperation. Losses upon misccordination, which play no role under complete information, become a central determinant of the players' ability to cooperate. In contrast with a trembling hand or a quantal response approach, this happens even as players become arbitrarily well-informed, and the likelihood of actual miscoordination becomes vanishingly small. With applications in mind, the paper provides a simple criterion for cooperation to be robust in games with approximately constant payoffs.
Because termination payoffs upon exit take a fairly general form, trigger strategies of a repeated game naturally map into strategies of an appropriate exit game. Values upon exit are simply equilibrium values following misbehavior. In that sense, the results of this paper are also relevant for the study of repeated games. While the global games perturbation does not fully resolve the problem of multiplicity, it adds realistic constraints on the sustainability of cooperation: for cooperation to be robust to the global games perturbation, the value of continued cooperation needs to be greater than the deviation temptation plus an additional penalty depending on losses upon miscoordination. Because the framework is very tractable, this provides an operational alternative to focusing on the full information Pareto frontier.
From a methodological perspective, the paper has two main contributions. The first is to show that because of the exit assumption, the lattice theory techniques developed in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , Vives (1990) or Echenique (2004) can be gainfully applied to dynamic cooperation games, even under private information. The second contribution is to show how the Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) approach to dynamic games can be used to study the impact of a global games information structure in a broader set of circumstances than one-shot coordination games. The analysis proceeds in two steps: the first step is to recognize that one-shot action profiles in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium must be Nash equilibria of an augmented one-shot game incorporating continuation values; the second step is to apply global games selection results that hold uniformly over the family of possible augmented games, and derive a fixed point equation for equilibrium continuation values.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of private information in infinite horizon cooperation games. Since Green and Porter (1984) , Stacchetti (1986, 1990 ), Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986), or Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), much of this literature has focused on settings in which there is imperfect but public monitoring, so that the relevant histories are always common knowledge, and coordination is never an issue. Under private monitoring, the relevant histories are no longer common knowledge and Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) have highlighted the importance of miscoordination problems in such circumstances. In particular, they show that even very small departures from public monitoring generate higher order uncertainty that puts significant restrictions on the set of equilibria. The present paper considers an alternative model of miscoordination in which current payoffs rather than past actions are the source of private information. This framework delivers tractable results that can be readily used in applied work investigating the impact of miscoordination fear on cooperation.
This paper also fits in the growing literature on dynamic global games. Much of this literature, however, avoids intertemporal incentives. Levin (2001) The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup. Section 3 delineates the mechanics of the paper in the context of a simple example. Section 4 extends the analysis to more general exit games and establishes the main selection results. Section 5 discusses potential applications and alternative models of miscoordination. Proofs are contained in the appendix, unless mentioned otherwise.
Framework

Exit games
Consider an infinite-horizon game with discrete time t ∈ N and two players i ∈ {1, 2} who share the same discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). In every period, the two players simultaneously where σ ≥ 0 and {ε i,t } i∈{1,2} , t∈N is an i.i.d. sequence of independent random variables taking values in the interval [−1, 1]. For simplicity w t is ex-post observable.
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For all σ ≥ 0, let Γ σ denote this dynamic game with imperfect information. The paper is concerned with equilibria of Γ σ when the noise level σ is strictly positive but arbitrarily small. According to this notation, Γ 0 denotes the complete information exit game in which the state w t is publicly observable. Additional assumptions will be introduced in Section 4.
Solution concepts
Because of the exit structure, at any decision point, it must be that players have always chosen to stay in the past. Hence, a history h i,t is simply characterized by a sequence of past and current signals, and past outcomes: h i,t ≡ {x i,1 , . . . , x i,t ; w 1 , . . . , w t−1 }. Let H denote the set of all such sequences. A pure strategy is a mapping s : H → {S, E}. Denote by Ω the set of pure strategies. For any set of strategies S ⊂ Ω, let ∆(S) denote the set of probability distributions over S that have a countable support. The two main solution concepts we will be using are perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential rationalizability. To define these concepts formally, it is convenient to denote by h 0 i,t ≡ {x i,1 , . . . , x i,t−1 ; w 1 , . . . , w t−1 } the histories before players receive period t's signal but after actions of period t − 1 have been taken. A strategy s −i of player −i, conditional on the history h ). Player i's sequential best-response correspondence, denoted by BR i,σ , is defined as follows. 
Given strategies s i , s −i and beliefs upon unattainable histories, let V i (h i,t ) denote the value player i expects from playing the game at history h i,t . Pairs of strategies and pairs of value functions will respectively be denoted by s ≡ (s i , s −i ) and V ≡ (V i , V −i ).
An example
This section focuses on a simple game where two partners repeatedly choose to keep putting effort in their joint project or quit. While this example is fairly restrictive (payoffs are symmetric and satisfy strong complementarity properties), it highlights in detail the main steps of the analysis and the technical difficulties that must be resolved to extend the global games framework to an infinite horizon.
Payoffs
Consider the exit game with symmetric flow payoffs given by,
where payoffs are given for the row player only, β is the discount factor, and c > b ≥ 0.
This game can be thought of as a stylized partnership game in which players repeatedly choose to keep putting effort in their partnership or quit. Value V E is the discounted present value of the players' constant outside option. 5 The state w t represents the expected returns from putting effort in the partnership at time t. Parameter c represents the losses from staying in the partnership when the other player walks out; parameter b (which can be set to 0) represents a potential benefit from cheating on a cooperating partner. When player i exits she obtains her outside option immediately. When player i stays but her partner exits, she obtains her outside option only in the next period.
States of the world w t are drawn from a distribution with density f and support R. It is assumed that E|w t | < ∞ and V E > 0. As in Section 2.1, the complete information version of this game is denoted by Γ 0 , while Γ σ denotes the game with i.i.d. global games perturbations.
. M is a coarse upper bound for feasible values.
The complete information case
As a benchmark, this section studies the complete information case, where σ = 0. Note that the option to exit allows player i to guarantee herself a minimum value V i > V E . Finally, whenever one player exits while the other stays, one player would always prefer to 5 For instance, V E = 1 1−β w E where w E is the flow payoff generated by the players' outside option. 6 The inequality is strict since for states of the world w t high enough, staying strictly dominates exit. change her decision ex post. Circumstances in which one player stays while the other exits are referred to as miscoordination.
Under complete information, the set of subgame perfect equilibria admits a least cooperative equilibrium and a most cooperative equilibrium, both of which take a simple thresholdform. In the least cooperative equilibrium, players exit if and only if w t ≤ (1 − β)V E + c.
Note that when w t > (1 − β)V E + c, it is dominant for players to stay. The most cooperative equilibrium is characterized by a threshold w such that players stay if and only if w t ≥ w.
This cooperation threshold w is the lowest state for which staying can be an equilibrium action. It is associated with the greatest equilibrium continuation value V and characterized by the following equations:
where equation (2) is equivalent to V =
Note that parameter c does not enter equations (1) or (2) . This means that under complete information the Pareto efficient equilibrium is entirely unaffected by losses upon miscoordination. In contrast, Section 3.3 shows that once private information is introduced, losses upon miscoordination become critical determinants of cooperation.
Under complete information, the partnership game generically admits a continuum of equilibria. Whenever x is such that
, then the pair of threshold-form strategies such that players stay whenever w t ≥ x and exit whenever w t < x is an equilibrium. Threshold w is the lowest such value of x. When w is not a local maximum of x + βV (x), then there exists η > 0 such that all x ∈ [w, w + η] are equilibrium thresholds. 
The incomplete information case
When players do not observe the state of the world w t but instead observe a noisy private signal x i,t = w t + σε i,t , miscoordination is possible in equilibrium. Players attempt to second guess each other's behavior and assess the miscoordination risk associated with each action.
In equilibrium, this risk is particularly high around states of the world at which the players change their behavior. This pushes players towards cautiousness, and reduces the scope for cooperation. The analysis of game Γ σ proceeds in two steps:
1. The first step shows that for a natural order over strategies the set of rationalizable strategies is bounded by extreme Markovian equilibria. This result relies on the exit game structure and exploits a partial form of monotone best-reply that is sufficient to apply the methods of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) . 
Monotone best-response and extreme equilibria
The first step of the analysis exploits the exit game structure along with payoff complementarities to show that game Γ σ satisfies a partial form of monotone best-response. 
Definition 3 The partial order on pure strategies is defined by
Note that player i's beliefs about history h −i,t depend both on history h i,t and player −i's strategy, s −i . Player i chooses to stay at history h i,t if and only if Π i S (V i ) ≥ Π i E . We are interested in how i's best-reply changes when s −i increases. An increase in s −i affects player i's choice between staying and exiting through three distinct channels:
• increasing s −i changes player i's continuation value V i ;
• increasing s −i changes player i's beliefs about the history h −i,t observed by player −i;
• keeping beliefs about h −i,t and continuation values constant, increasing s −i affects player i's static incentives to stay.
It will be shown that the effects of increasing s −i on continuation values and static incentives both contribute towards making player i stay more as well. The effect on beliefs, however, is ambiguous. For this reason, the analysis initially focuses on Markovian strategies, for which this ambiguous effect on beliefs cancels out.
Definition 4 (Markovian strategies)
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, a strategy s i is said to be Marko-
When player −i's strategy is Markovian, then in period t, the action taken by player −i depends only on her current signal x −i,t , and not on her past history h 0 −i,t . Furthermore, player i's belief about x −i,t depends only on her own signal x i,t and not on player −i's strategy s −i . Hence, when s −i is Markovian, player i's expected payoffs given her actions need only be conditioned on her own history, and not on player −i's strategy. Given a Markovian strategy s −i , the following facts hold.
The proof is straightforward given that V i > V E , c > b and
This corresponds to the fact that for any V i > V E , the one-shot game
is supermodular and, in particular, exhibits increasing differences in actions.
Fact 2 (dynamic complementarity)
Indeed, we have that This partial form of monotone best-reply is sufficient to replicate the construction of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) or Vives (1990) , and show that the set of all sequentially rationalizable strategies is bounded by a highest and a lowest Markovian equilibrium. Indeed, "staying always" and "exiting always" are Markovian strategies that clearly bound the set of all possible strategies. By iteratively applying the best-reply mapping, one can bracket the set of sequentially rationalizable strategies between increasing and decreasing sequences of Markovian strategies that converge to extreme Markovian equilibria. Let s 
Dynamic selection
Since the set of sequentially rationalizable strategies is bounded by extreme, symmetric Markovian equilibria, it is sufficient to focus on symmetric Markovian equilibria to charac-terize the range of PBEs of Γ σ . The analysis follows the dynamic programming approach of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). Given a symmetric Markovian equilibrium s σ , let us denote by V σ the value of playing that equilibrium. In any period t, s σ induces a one-shot action profile that is a Nash equilibrium of the static coordination game
where players observe a noisy signal x i,t = w t + σε i,t . Let us denote by Ψ σ (V σ ) this one- This Nash equilibrium is characterized by a threshold x * σ (V ) such that for all i ∈ {1, 2}, player i stays if and only if
the risk-dominance threshold of the one-shot augmented game Ψ 0 (V ).
Consider σ > 0 small, so that Fact 3 holds. Given a value V ∈ [V E , M], let φ σ (V ) be the value of playing the one-shot game Ψ σ (V ) according to its unique equilibrium. We have
.
By stationarity, the value V σ of playing Markovian equilibrium s σ is also the value of playing the one-shot game Ψ σ (V σ ) according to its unique equilibrium. Hence value V σ must satisfy
with a Markovian equilibrium of Γ σ such that players stay and exit according to threshold
are the greatest and smallest fixed points of φ σ . As σ goes to 0, the threshold x * σ (V ) converges uniformly to x RD (V ). Furthermore, as σ goes to 0, the likelihood that
. This implies that the value mapping φ σ converges uniformly to the mapping Φ defined by
The mapping Φ and its fixed points are easy to compute, and provide an accurate characterization of equilibria of Γ σ for σ small. Indeed, the fixed points of φ σ generically converge to the fixed points of Φ: the fact that φ σ converges uniformly to Φ implies that any converging sequence of fixed points (V σ ) σ>0 of φ σ must converge to a fixed point V of Φ; conversely, any fixed point V of Φ such that Φ ′ (V ) = 1 is the limit of some sequence (V σ ) σ>0 of fixed points of φ σ . 8 Let V L and V H denote the extreme fixed points of Φ. The associated thresholds
characterize the highest and lowest levels of cooperation that can be sustained in game Γ σ as σ goes to 0. Since the set of rationalizable strategies is bounded by Markovian equilibria, whenever Φ has a unique fixed point, game Γ σ has an asymptotically (a) Unique fixed point: η = 1. unique equilibrium.
Note that the global games perturbation does not necessarily lead to uniqueness in infinite horizon games. Figure 1 plots Φ when the state w t is drawn from a Gaussian distribution
for different values of η. While the range of equilibria under complete information is roughly the same for the values of η considered, the impact of a global games information structure on the set of equilibria depends significantly on the shape of distribution f . In particular, in the example of Figure 1 , Φ admits multiple fixed points when the distribution f has low variance, and a unique fixed point when f has high variance.
While the exit game Γ σ can admit multiple asymptotic Markovian equilibria, there is finitely many of them. This contrasts with the complete information case in which there is a continuum of equilibria. Section 4.4 also highlights that under the global games perturbation, the set of equilibria is very structured. In particular, the stability and basin of attraction of equilibria with respect to iterated best-reply is essentially characterized by the stability and basin of attraction of fixed points of Φ. This provides additional insights on which equilibria may or may not be selected.
In the context of this paper, the global games perturbation is perhaps best understood as a way to model fear of miscoordination. Because players have different assessments of their environment, one partner may choose to exit while the other stays, and miscoordination can occur in equilibrium. 9 More importantly, because miscoordination is driven by noise in the information structure, the likelihood of miscoordination depends both on the current state and on what strategies players are using. Miscoordination is most likely in states close to the critical threshold at which players change their behavior. For this reason, in equilibrium, losses upon miscoordination are an important determinant of the sustainability of cooperation, even though players are well informed and the ex ante likelihood of actual miscoordination is small. Fear of miscoordination, rather than miscoordination itself, affects the players' ability to cooperate.
Taking into account fear of miscoordination can affect comparative statics significantly.
Equation (4) 
Assumptions
The assumptions that follow serve different purposes. 
, where i is the row player. Assumption 3 (increasing differences in the state of the world) For all i ∈ {1, 2},
, with a slope greater than some real number r > 0.
Definition 5 For any functions
where i is the row player. Let Ψ σ (V i , V −i ) denote the corresponding one-shot global game in which players observe signals x i,t = w t + σε i,t .
Assumption 4 (coordination)
For all states of the world w t , the one-shot game G(m i , m −i , w t ) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and all pure equilibria belong to {(S, S), (E, E)}.
Recall that m i is player i's min-max value in the full information game Γ 0 . When Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, Assumption 4 is equivalent to the fact that for all i ∈ {1, 2}, if the state
In words, whenever the state is high enough for player i to stay although player −i exits, then player −i's best-reply under complete information is to stay as well. This can be seen as a single-crossing property of the kind identified by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . It ensures that augmented one-shot games Ψ σ (V) exhibit strategic complementarities.
11 It is strictly weaker than assuming that such one-shot games −i,t , and a −i|h i,t is effectively a mapping from R to {stay, exit}. For any mapping V i that maps player i's current signal, x i,t ∈ R, to a continuation value V i (x i,t ), and any mapping a −i : R → ∆{stay, exit}, one can define BR i,σ (a −i , V i ), as the one-shot best-response correspondence of player i when she expects a continuation value V i and player −i uses action profile a −i .
The next lemma establishes that the best-reply mappings for one-shot action profiles and for dynamic strategies admit highest and lowest elements: a basic property necessary to apply the tools of lattice theory. 
Point (i) of Lemma 2 is a consequence of Assumption 4. Point (ii) relies on the exit structure: a general increase in future values increases the incentives to stay. Along with Assumption 5, which ensures that strategic complementarities hold across time periods, this allows us to show that Γ σ exhibits monotone best-response as long as there is a Markovian strategy on one side of the inequality.
Proposition 1 (partial monotone best response)
There exists σ such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ), whenever s −i is a Markovian strategy, then, for all strategies s
and 
. By point (ii) of Lemma 2, we have that = stay} > 0, we must have P rob{a −i|h i,t = stay} = 1. Lemma 2 yields that
Combining equations (7) and (8) we obtain that indeed, for all s ′′ ∈ BR i,σ (s
). An identical proof holds for the other inequality. As will be highlighted below, Proposition 1 is the key step to prove the existence of extreme Markovian equilibria. Furthermore, these extreme equilibria have a simple structure. A strategy s i is said to take a threshold-form if there exists a value x such that for all histories h i,t , s i (h i,t ) = S if and only if x i,t ≥ x. A strategy of threshold x will be denoted s x . The following lemma shows that the best-reply to a threshold-form strategy is a threshold-form strategy.
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Lemma 3 There exists σ > 0 such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ) and any x ∈ R, there exists
Together, Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 imply the following theorem. 
The next section characterizes these extreme Markovian equilibria as σ goes to 0.
Dynamic selection
We can now state the main selection result of the paper. It shows that continuation values associated with Markovian equilibria of Γ σ must be fixed points of a mapping φ σ (·) that converges uniformly to an easily computable mapping Φ from R 2 to R 2 . This provides explicit bounds for the set of rationalizable values and shows that the set of Markovian equilibria -which is a continuum under full information -typically shrinks to a finite number of elements under a global games information structure. 
A corollary of Theorem 2 is that whenever Φ has a unique fixed point, the set of rationalizable strategies of game Γ σ converges to a single pair of strategies as σ goes to 0. 14 More generally, extreme fixed points of Φ characterize the range of PBEs of game Γ σ for σ small.
Computing these extreme fixed points is particularly easy in the focal case where the distribution f of the state of the world w is very concentrated around a state w 0 , so that the game exhibits approximately constant payoffs. As before, for any V ∈ R 2 , we denote by G(V, w 0 ) the associated one-shot complete information game augmented with continuation
) the value of staying in every period and
22 (w 0 )) the value of immediate exit, when the state is constant and equal to w 0 . Consider a sequence {f n } n∈N of distributions for state of the world w such that for all n ∈ N, Assumptions 1 to 5 are satisfied and f n converges to δ w 0 , the unit mass at w 0 .
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Let Φ n denote the value mapping associated with f n and let V H n and V L n denote the highest and lowest fixed points of Φ n . The following holds.
Proposition 2 (a robustness criterion)
Because Proposition 2 depends only on payoffs at w 0 , it can be used to define a simple robustness criterion for cooperation in exit games with constant payoffs. 16 Cooperation is robust to the fear of miscoordination if and only if staying is risk-dominant in the one-shot game augmented with the value of playing (S, S) in every period. If instead exiting is risk dominant, then the only robust equilibrium is for both players to exit in every period. As Section 5.2 highlights, this tractable robustness criterion offers a convenient way to explore how global games perturbations may change comparative statics.
Local dominance solvability
One of the central results of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) is that as the noise term σ becomes small, one-shot global games are dominance solvable. In that sense, selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium is robust to the relaxation of common knowledge of equilibrium strategies, and only relies on common knowledge of rationality. As Section 3 highlights in the context of the partnership game example, the global games perturbation does not necessarily yield unique selection in settings with infinite horizon, and dominance solvability 15 Specifically {f n } n∈N converges to δ w0 in the sense that lim n→+∞ D|f n − δ w0 | = 0, where D, defined in Assumption 1, is a function that dominates payoff functions. 16 Note that these results correspond to an order of limits where first noise σ goes to 0 and then distribution f goes to δ w0 . It can be shown that this order of limits is the one that corresponds to the most stringent robustness test. Taking the other order of limits brings us back to the complete information case.
does not generally hold. This section shows that the global games perturbation gives bite to the weaker concept of local dominance solvability.
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Nash equilibrium presumes common knowledge of equilibrium strategies. When a game is dominance solvable, as one-shot global games are, common knowledge of the set of all strategies is sufficient to get to equilibrium. A game is locally dominance solvable at an equilibrium s if common knowledge that strategies belong to some neighborhood of s yields s as the only rationalizable strategy profile. This section characterizes the asymptotic local dominance solvability of game Γ σ around its Markovian equilibria. For this we need to introduce the mapping ξ which maps future cooperation thresholds to current cooperation thresholds.
Definition 6 (the threshold mapping)
For all x ∈ R, let us denote by BRV i,0 (x) player i's value for best-replying to a strategy of threshold x in the complete information game Γ 0 .
The threshold mapping ξ : R → R is defined by
Note that by Assumptions 3 and 5, ξ is weakly increasing.
For any x, ξ(x) is the risk-dominance threshold of Ψ 0 (BRV i,0 (x), BRV −i,0 (x)), the oneshot game augmented with the value of best-replying against x in the future. If a pair of values V is a fixed point of Φ, then x RD (V) is a fixed point of ξ. Conversely, if x is a fixed point of ξ, then (BRV i,0 (x), BRV −i,0 (x)) is a fixed point of Φ. The principal reason for introducing ξ is that it is a mapping from R to R while Φ is a mapping from R 2 to R 2 . This facilitates the study of its fixed points.
Given order , for any real numbers y < z, we can define [s z , s y ] as the interval of strategies greater than s z and smaller than s y . 18 The following result holds.
Theorem 3 (asymptotic local dominance solvability) Whenever x is a stable fixed point 17 See for instance Guesnerie (2002) or Moulin (1984) . 18 This interval includes non-Markovian strategies.
of ξ and y < z belong to the basin of attraction of x with respect to ξ then
It follows from Theorem 3 that as σ goes to 0, game Γ σ is asymptotically locally dominance solvable at any Markovian equilibrium associated with a stable fixed point of ξ. 19 In particular, extreme Markovian equilibira s H σ and s L σ are asymptotically locally dominance solvable. Theorem 3 also characterizes the basin of attraction of Markovian equilibria with respect to iterated best-reply. This quantifies the extent to which common knowledge of equilibrium strategies can be relaxed. The greater the basin of attraction, the more common knowledge of equilibrium strategies can be relaxed. Finally, Theorem 3 provides additional insight on the structure of equilibria. First, it implies that there can be no equilibrium strictly contained within two consecutive Markovian equilibria. Second, any Markovian equilibrium associated with an unstable fixed point of ξ is unstable with respect to iterated best-reply.
Discussion
Modeling fear of miscoordination
As has been highlighted in Section 3, in the context of this paper, the global games perturbation is best understood as a way to model fear of miscoordination. The idea that players make noisy private assessments of the world, and that this makes coordination difficult, is reasonable. Still, there are other ways to introduce miscoordination in equilibirum. In particular, trembling hand perturbations and quantal response equilbrium both share this feature. However, they correspond to very different models of miscoordination fear.
In a trembling hand approach, for instance, losses upon miscoordination affect the sustainability of cooperation if and only if the likelihood of trembles is high. In that case 19 Note that computations can be simplified by considering the mapping ζ :
Computing ζ is simpler than computing ξ and both functions coincide around their fixed points. However, ζ need not be increasing.
however, while losses upon miscoordination affect the choices made by the players, realized behavior approaches randomness. A quantal response approach would share the same drawback. 20 This contrasts with the approach developed in this paper, where the ex ante likelihood of miscoordination is vanishing and players are, on average, very good at predicting their opponent's behavior. Here, losses upon miscoordination affects the sustainability of cooperation by restricting the players' ability to select the efficient equilibrium. When losses upon miscoordination increase, joint exit tends to become a focal point.
One can think of the global games approach as endogenizing the likelihood of trembles.
In particular, the likelihood of miscoordination depends on both the state of the world and the strategies that players are using. Even as the players' information becomes arbitrarily good, the likelihood of miscoordination remains large around the critical states at which players change their behavior. This imposes significant constraints on equilibrium strategies and, as the next section discusses, can significantly alter comparative statics.
Fear of miscoordination and comparative statics
The robustness criterion of Proposition 2 is a useful tool to explore how fear of miscoordination can affect comparative statics. Consider for instance the partnership game of Section 3, in a setting where the state of the world is approximately constant and equal to w 0 , with 1 1−β w 0 > V E , so that staying permanently is the efficient outcome. Under complete information, staying is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
In contrast, Proposition 2 implies that staying is robust to the introduction of small amounts of private information about the state of the world if and only if
20 Note that a variant of quantal response in which players obtain precise signals about one another's payoff shocks would generate predictions qualitatively similar to those of this paper.
Whenever the opposite inequality holds, permanent exit is the only robust equilibrium.
Condition (9) reflects that under complete information, cooperation is sustainable if and only if the value of continued cooperation is greater than the deviation temptation. Condition (10) highlights that when the state of the world is uncertain and players try to second guess each other's actions, then cooperation is sustainable if and only if the value of continued cooperation is greater than the deviation temptation plus a penalty that corresponds, in this symmetric game, to losses upon miscoordination. where V E = 1 1−β w E with 0 < w E < w 0 . In this game, if player i stays while her partner exits, she does not get her outside option V E in the future. 21 Hence, as β goes to 1, losses upon miscoordination also grow arbitrarily large. If w 0 < 2w E , increasing the discount factor β makes it more difficult to sustain cooperation robustly, and as β approaches 1, immediate exit is the only robust equilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to model fear of miscoordination in dynamic environments. complete information game which admits a continuum of equilibria.
Finally, by introducing a realistic risk of miscoordination in equilibrium, the global games perturbation places additional intuitive restrictions on sustainable levels of cooperation. In addition to the deviation temptation, losses upon miscoordination become an important determinant of the sustainability of cooperation. Taking into account the impact of fear of miscoordination on cooperation can significantly change comparative statics. With applications in mind, the paper provides a tractable robustness criterion.
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 4.2
Given a continuation value function V i , the expected payoffs upon staying and exitingrespectively denoted by Π 
Stationarity implies that equilibrium actions at any time t must form a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game
22 (w t ) where i is the row player and players get signals x i,t = w t + σε i,t . All such one-shot games 
the game Ψ σ (V) has a unique pair of rationalizable strategies. These strategies take a threshold-form and the associated pair of thresholds is denoted by x * σ (V);
2. The pair of thresholds x * σ (V) is continuous in V;
3. As σ goes to 0, x * σ (V) converges to the risk dominant threshold x RD (V) uniformly
The first result, joint selection, implies that there is a unique vector of expected values from playing game Ψ σ (V), which we denote φ σ (V). The other two results imply that φ σ (V) is continuous in V, and that as σ goes to 0, φ σ (V) converges uniformly over V ∈ × i∈{1,2} [m i − ν, M i ] to the vector of values Φ(V) players expect from using the risk-dominant strategy under full information.
Stationarity implies that the value vector V of any Markovian equilibrium of Γ σ must satisfy the fixed point equation V = φ σ (V). Conversely, any vector of values V satisfying V = φ σ (V) is supported by the Markovian equilibrium in which players play the unique equilibrium of game Ψ σ (V) each period. This gives us (ii).
Furthermore, we know that the equilibrium strategies of game Ψ σ (V) converge to the risk-dominant strategy as σ goes to 0. This allows us to compute explicitly the limit function Φ. Because the risk-dominance threshold is decreasing in the continuation value, and using Assumption 5, it follows that Φ is increasing in V. This proves (iii).
Finally, (i) is a straightforward implication of (ii). Values associated with Markovian equilibria of Γ σ are the fixed points of φ σ (·). Hence the highest and lowest values associated with Markovian equilibria are also the highest and lowest fixed points of φ σ (·).
Proof of Proposition 2: First, for any µ > 0, there exists N > 0 such that for any This and the fact that f n converges to a Dirac mass at w 0 implies that there exists N such
By taking µ arbitrarily small, it follows that V H n converges to V L, * as n goes to infinity. Similar proofs hold for points (ii) and (iii).
A.3 On the convergence of fixed points of φ σ
The uniform convergence of φ σ to Φ is useful only to the extent that it implies that the fixed points of φ σ converge to the fixed points Φ. Proposition A.1 shows that uniform convergence of φ σ to Φ implies that fixed points of φ σ necessarily converge to a subset of fixed points of Φ as σ goes to 0. This corresponds to the upper-hemicontinuity of fixed points of φ σ at σ = 0. Proposition A.2 shows that under generic conditions, any fixed point of Φ is the limit of a sequence (V σ ) σ>0 of fixed points of φ σ . This corresponds to the lower-hemicontinuity of fixed points of φ σ as σ goes to 0. Proof of Proposition A.1: Since V n converges to V and Φ is continuous, for all τ > 0, there exists N 1 such that for all n ≥ N 1
Since φ σn (·) converges uniformly to Φ and V n is a fixed point of φ σn , there exists In other terms, x is non-singular whenever ξ cuts strictly through the 45 o line at x. Assume that x is a stable fixed point -i.e. ξ cuts the 45 o line from above -then Theorem 3 implies that, for all η > 0, there exists σ > 0 and η ∈ (0, η) such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ), the interval [x − η, x + η] is stable by χ σ . Since χ σ is continuous and increasing, this implies that it has a fixed point belonging to [x − η, x + η]. This proves the lower hemicontinuity of stable fixed points of ξ.
Assume that x is unstable. Then for any η > 0, there exists η ∈ (0, η) such that x − η and x + η respectively belong to the basins of attraction of a lower and a higher fixed point of ξ. Lemma A.3 implies that there exist η ′ and η ′′ in (0, η) such that χ σ (x − η ′ ) < x − η 
A.4 Proofs for Section 4.4
The proof of Theorem 3 is broken down in multiple steps. Lemma A.2 shows that the bestreply correspondence does not deviate from the identity mapping around fixed points of ξ. Lemma A.3 is the main step of the proof. It shows that whenever x is a stable fixed point of ξ, then for σ small enough, the first step of iterated best-response shrinks neighborhoods of s x . Proof of Lemma A.2: Since x is a fixed point of ξ, it must be that x is the risk-dominant threshold of the augmented one-shot game G(BRV i,0 (x), BRV −i,0 (x), w). Hence, at w = x, both (E, E) and (S, S) are strict Nash equilibria of this one-shot game. Since BRV i,σ (x ′ ) is continuous in σ and x ′ , and payoffs are continuous in w, there exist η > 0 and σ < η/4 such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ) and x ′ ∈ [x − η, x + η], then for all w ∈ [x ′ − σ, x ′ + σ], both (E, E) and (S, S) are strict Nash equilibria of G(BRV i,σ (x ′ ), BRV −i,σ (x ′ ), w).
For any σ ∈ (0, σ) and x ′ ∈ [x − η/2, x + η/2], the best-reply to a threshold-form strategy is also a threshold-form strategy. This implies that indeed BR i,σ (x ′ ) takes the form s x ′′ . Let us show that|x ′′ −x ′ | < 2σ. When she gets a signal x i,t < x ′ −2σ, player i knows for sure that player −i will be playing E. From the definition of η, we know that (E, E) is an equilibrium of G(BRV i,σ (x ′ ), BRV −i,σ (x ′ ), w) for all values of w consistent with a signal value x i,t . Thus, it must be that player i's best-reply is to play E as well. Inversely, when she gets a signal x i,t > x ′ + 2σ, player i knows that player −i will play S, and her best-reply is to Stay as well. This implies that |x ′′ − x ′ | < 2σ. We have that ξ(x ′ ) > x ′ . By continuity of ξ there existsx ′ such thatx ′ < x ′ and ξ(x ′ ) > x ′ .
To reduce confusion, we temporarily use the notation BR os i,σ (a, V ) to denote the best-reply of player i to a one shot action profile a and continuation value V . Using the fact that one-shot action profiles are identical to Markovian strategies, we obtain, Joint with Assumption 5, this implies that, BRV i,σ (BR −i,σ (s x ′ )) ≤ BRV i,σ (x ′ ). Furthermore,
. Hence, using inequality (13) , and the fact 22 Recall that if a and b are thresholds such that a > b then the corresponding strategies satisfy s a s b .
that for i ∈ {1, 2}, BR n (s x + ) converges to a threshold strategy with a threshold x + i,σ that converges to x as σ goes to 0. This concludes the proof.
